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Abstract: Biometric technology is rapidly being adopted in wide variety of security applications. However, the system
itself is not completely foolproof and is vulnerable to many attacks. Some of the attacks on the biometric system are very
severe, one of which is the attack on template security. In spite of the various template security techniques presented
in the literature, none of them is able to provide security, diversity, revocability, and good performance simultaneously
to the biometric system. Fuzzy vault is one of the most promising bio-cryptographic techniques to prevent the template
data from being misused. To make the fuzzy vault practically realizable in real-life applications especially for large
databases, the chaﬀ generation time needs to be reduced to a greater extent. This work focuses on decreasing the chaﬀ
generation time to reduce the overall vault creation time. The approach presented in the paper has also been tested on
real-time dedicated hardware using fingerprint data acquired in real time by using a fingerprint sensor Verifier 300LC to
bridge the gap between the research and real-time application scenarios.
Key words: Biometrics, biometric security, fingerprint recognition, template security, fuzzy vault, chaﬀ points, microcontrollers

1. Introduction
Biometrics was introduced and evolved in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The benefits of using biometrics
include enhancement of security, convenience, accountability, reduction in fraud, and delivery of enhanced
services [1]. During biometric data acquisition, an unprocessed image or recording of a characteristic, referred
to as raw biometric data or as a biometric sample, is provided. Once the biometric data are acquired, biometric
templates can be created by a process of feature extraction. Feature extraction is the automated process of
locating and encoding distinctive characteristics from biometric data in order to generate a template. It may
remove noises and unwanted data and digitize biometric traits [2]. Template security is one of the prime
concerns for researchers. If an adversary is able to gain unauthorized access to the template, he/she may be
able to generate the original biometric data from it. This regenerated sample may be passed as an input to the
biometric system, leading to a security breach [3,4]. Out of the eight major attack points on a biometric system
as identified by Ratha et al. [5], attack at the stored template is very severe for the above-stated reason. There
are a number of techniques available in the literature to prevent the template from being hacked or misused by
malignant users. Fuzzy vault is one of the most reliable cryptographic methods to protect the template from
hacking [6].
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2. Fuzzy vault scheme
Originally the fuzzy vault was proposed by Juels and Sudan [7]. Later on Clancy et al. [8] improvised the
scheme by adding random noise points at some fixed distance apart from genuine points and making the scheme
implementable in real scenarios. Because of its robustness this scheme has become very popular in the literature
and has been tried and successfully implemented with various biometric traits, e.g. fingerprint, iris, retina, and
palm print. The fuzzy vault has two main stages during its implementation: encoding and decoding [9]. The
intermediate results obtained during fuzzy vault implementation for encoding and decoding stages are presented
in Figure 1. During the process of encoding, generation of chaﬀ points (noise points) takes maximum time [10].
However, as the number of chaﬀ points is increased the security level will also increase. Hence there is a strong
tradeoﬀ between the time taken to add number of chaﬀ points and the security level of the system. Generally
chaﬀ points to be added are 10 times the genuine minutiae points extracted from the input image at the time
of enrolment [11].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 discusses the related work in the area, Section
4 describes the proposed methodology in detail, Section 5 discusses the experimental setup, Section 6 focuses
on the results obtained, Section 7 is about performance evaluation of the system, and Section 8 mentions the
conclusions drawn.
3. Related work
The basic concept of fuzzy vault was first introduced by Juels and Sudan [7] in 2002 along with the locking
and unlocking algorithms of the fuzzy vault. Authors focused on the security of the fuzzy vault, stating that
it depends on the number of chaﬀ points added to the genuine minutiae set. The security of the fuzzy vault is
directly proportional to the number of added noise points. If the number of chaﬀ points is increased then the
overall security of the system will also increase [7]. Clancy et al. [8] later on modified the algorithm so as to
make chaﬀ point addition realizable in real life with all its parameters optimized to a greater extent. Authors
left a gap as how to pack more chaﬀ points in same space. Nandakumar et al. [12] presented a fully automatic
fingerprint fuzzy vault with iterative closest point-based alignment of input and query images. The authors
concluded that the fuzzy vault that does not involve chaﬀ point addition should be redesigned. A modified
fingerprint fuzzy vault with helper data and autoalignment feature is presented in [13,14]. Hooda and Kaur [15]
presented a naive idea using axis distance to reduce chaﬀ point addition time for Clancy’s algorithm. However,
the threshold equivalence is not established between Euclidean distance as used by Clancy et al. [8] and axis
distance is used as distance metric by the authors so as to generalize the concept.
Khalil-Hani and Bakheri [11] proposed real-time implementation of a fuzzy vault for a resource-constrained
embedded system. The proposed technique of chaﬀ generation was less vulnerable to brute force attacks as it
uniformly divided the chaﬀ generation space from the addition of first chaﬀ point until the last required chaﬀ
point to the fuzzy vault set. The proposed technique is based on a circle packing mathematical algorithm and
is less compute intensive than Clancy’s approach. Khalil-Hani et al. [10] reduced the overall complexity by
eliminating the need for complex square and square root computations done during chaﬀ point addition. The
authors also proposed a hardware implementation of the fuzzy vault scheme in embedded processors like the
Altria Stratix II FPGA development board. The results represent a remarkable time reduction during chaﬀ
point addition as compared to Clancy’s chaﬀ generation. Nguyen et al. [16,17] proposed an improved chaﬀ generation scheme that further reduced chaﬀ generation time and reduced complexity compared to Khalil-Hani et
al. [10,11]. The authors reduced the number of comparisons required to add and qualify a new candidate point
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Figure 1. Fuzzy vault encoding and decoding.

as a chaﬀ point. The candidate points in the whole process were also reduced to a greater extent as compared to
Khalil-Hani et al. [10,11]. Benhammadi and Bey [18] proposed a hybrid approach of hardening fingerprint vault
by combining user generated password fuzzy vault with the transformed minutiae pairwise features to provide
diversity and security to fingerprint minutiae templates. The authors have generated 1024 random minutiae
pairwise chaﬀ points. The results show that the system takes less time to authenticate the user as compared
to Nandakumar et al. [12] with an acceptable level of security. Nguyen et al. [19] proposed a nonrandom
chaﬀ point generator in which chaﬀ points are generated using continuous hashing and linear projection. Chaﬀ
points are considered as signature for the combination of biometric template and key. Thus any modification
with the original vault can be detected and blend substitution attacks can be prevented. Nguyen et al. [20]
proposed a fingerprint fuzzy vault for distorted fingerprint images using ridge features information. In order to
hide genuine ridge features, the authors have proposed an algorithm for generating chaﬀ ridge features.
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Most of the work focuses on reduction in fuzzy vault implementation time, so that the technique can
be adopted for real-world applications. The next section discusses the proposed approach in detail, describing
the methodology adopted to reduce the chaﬀ addition time, which leads to a reduction in overall fuzzy vault
implementation time.
4. Proposed chaﬀ generation methodology
The proposed chaﬀ generation approach modifies the chaﬀ generation process for the base algorithms of Clancy
et al. [8] and Nguyen et al. [16,17]. Both the algorithms compute Euclidean distance for distance comparisons
between the selected point and a genuine minutiae point. However, the Euclidean distance computations are
complex and more time consuming as they require the square and square root computations. The proposed
approach makes use of Manhattan distance instead of Euclidean distance, which leads to a significant reduction
in the chaﬀ generation time. The modified approach is less compute intensive as it eliminates the need for
complex square and square root operations. The approach works well as the absolute distance comparisons are
not required for classifying any candidate chaﬀ point as a valid chaﬀ point and for this purpose only relative
distance comparisons may work based upon an optimized threshold value. The equivalence established between
Euclidean distance and Manhattan distance is described below, where D(Eucl) is the Euclidean distance and
D(M an) represents the Manhattan distance and ∆x = (x−x1 ) and ∆y = (y−y1 ) for two points (x, y) and
(x1 , y1 ),
D(Eucl) =

√
2
2
(∆x) + (∆y)

(1)

D (M an) = (|∆x| + |∆y|)
2

2

2

(2)
2

(∆x) + (∆y) = (∆x) + (∆y)
Add 2 |∆x∆y| to R.H.S.
2

2

2

2

(∆x) + (∆y) ≤ (∆x) +2 |∆x∆y| + (∆y)
So,
2

2

(∆x) + (∆y) ≤(|∆x| + |∆y|)

2

(3)

From (1), (2), and (3)
2

2

(D(Eucl) ) ≤ (D(M an) )

(4)

Since the square of a real number is nonnegative
2

2

2

(∆x) − 2|∆x∆y| + (∆y) = (|∆x| − |∆y|) ≥0

(5)

2

Add (|∆x| + |∆y|) to both sides
2

2

(|∆x| − |∆y|) +(|∆x| + |∆y|) ≥(|∆x| + | ∆y|)
2

2

2

2

2

(6)
2

(∆x) − 2|∆x∆y| + (∆y) + (∆x) + 2|∆x∆y| + (∆y) ≥(|∆x| + |∆y|)
2

2

2 × ((∆x) + (∆y) ) ≥(|∆x| + |∆y|)
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From (5), (6), and (7)
2

2 × (D(Eucl) ) ≥ (D(M an) )

2

(8)

From (7) and (8) it can be concluded that
D(M an) = f (D(Eucl) )

2

2

2

2

(D(Eucl) ) ≤ (D(M an) ) && 2 × (D(Eucl) ) ≥ (D(M an) )

(9)

Now assuming δ(Eucl) as a threshold value in Euclidian distance and δ(M an) as a threshold in Manhattan
distance, the relation between the two threshold values can be established from (9) as
2

2

2

2

(δ(Eucl) ) ≤ (δ(M an) ) && 2 × (δ(Eucl) ) ≥ (δ(M an) )

(10)

Thus the condition specifies limits (maxima and minima) on the value of δ and the floor value of average of
these maxima and minima may be taken as δ(M an) .
Steps of the proposed approach are as follows:
Step 1: Acquire the fingerprint image.
Step 2: Apply the pre-processing steps as binarization, thresholding, thinning etc. on it.
Step 3: Apply crossing number approach [1,9] to extract genuine minutiae points as
GM = {m 1 , m 2 . . . m j }, where m j represents the coordinates (x, y) for a minutiae point.
Step 4: To add chaﬀ points in genuine minutiae set GM, Clancy’s [8] and Nguyen’s [16,17] approaches
of chaﬀ point addition are modified as illustrated in Figure 2 and discussed below in Sections 4.1 and 4.2,
respectively.

(x 2, y 2)

(x 1, y 1)

d

(x 1, y 1)

d
(x 2, y 2)

Genuine Minutiae Point
(a) Modified Clancy’s Approach

Candidate Chaff Point

Chaff Point

d : Manhattan Distance

(b) Modified Nguyen’s Approach

Figure 2. Illustration of modified approaches.
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4.1. Modified Clancy’s approach
Clancy modified the original fuzzy vault as proposed by Jules and Sudan [7], with the justification that the
chaﬀ points/random points to be added to the set of genuine points to form a vault should be placed at an
appropriate distance ‘d’ apart from vault members. It makes use of Euclidian distance as a metric for comparing
the distance between the new chaﬀ point to be added with the existing list of points (genuine minutiae points
and chaﬀ points), which makes the approach more compute intensive. To improve upon it, the proposed
modifications in the existing approach are as below:
i. Consider a vault list (VL) = GM
ii. Generate a random point ( x, y ) in the image. To qualify the chosen point as a chaﬀ point it has to be
δ distance apart from all the points in VL. Value of δ in the case of the modified Clancy’s approach is
computed using Eq. (10).
iii. Compute the Manhattan distance ‘d’ between the selected point (x 1 , y 1 ) and other existing points (x i ,
y i ) in the vault list.
d = |x−xi | + |y−yi |
iv. If d ≥

δ(M an) for all points in VL

then (x, y ) qualifies as a chaﬀ point and add (x, y ) to VL
else
generate new random point.
v. Repeat the steps ii, iii, and iv to generate the required number of chaﬀ points.
4.2. Modified Nguyen’s approach
Nguyen’s approach gave significant time reduction compared with Clancy [8] and Khalil-Hani [11], especially
when the number of minutiae points is above 20. However, this approach still makes use of Euclidean distance
as a measure. The steps to be followed in the modified approach are described below:
i. Consider a vault list (VL) = GM
ii. Split fingerprint image into equispaced cells of square matrix.
iii. Choose a random cell.
iv. if (random cell contains a genuine minutiae point or chaﬀ point)
discard it and go to step iii
else
consider the cell for candidate chaﬀ point and select a random point (x 1 , y 1 )
v. Compute Manhattan distance ‘d’ among (x 1 , y 1 ) and points in its eight adjacent neighborhood cells
(N 8 (p)) from the VL.
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vi. Using Eq. (10) δ(M an) , a threshold value is computed for modified Nguyen’s approach
vii. if d ≥

δ(M an) for all N 8 (p) ( eight adjacent pixels), where p is (x 1 , y 1 )

then (x 1 , y 1 ) qualifies as a chaﬀ point and add (x 1 , y 1 ) to VL
else
discard (x 1 , y 1 ) as chaﬀ point
viii. Repeat the steps from iii to vii to generate the required number of chaﬀ points.
The proposed approach works well as by using Manhattan distance instead of Euclidean distance the chaﬀ
generation time is reduced significantly especially in worst case comparisons when for each chaﬀ point addition
the distance of all eight adjacent cells from the candidate cell needs to be compared. The modified approach is
less compute intensive as it eliminates the need for complex square and square root operations. The approach
works well as the absolute distance comparisons are not required and only relative distance comparisons may
work and the value δ (threshold) is adjusted accordingly as per Eq. (10).
5. Proposed system design and experimental setup
Chaﬀ point addition is a time critical task and so a dedicated hardware-based experimental setup is considered
to test the time taken by modified Clancy’s and modified Nguyen’s approaches and the results are compared
with the base algorithms also implemented on the same setup. Figure 3 represents the system block diagram.
The system has been tested using the Windows 8 operating system (64-bit). Image acquisition has been done
using a Verifier 300LC fingerprint scanner with a resolution of 500 dpi. A Mega Matcher SDK 4.0 (Multimodal
Biometric SDK) is used for fingerprint data acquisition. Genuine minutiae points are extracted using MATLAB
7 and are then passed as an input to the dedicated hardware module through a USB port. The hardware
module computes chaﬀ points corresponding to the true minutiae and sends them back to the system with
an execution time stamp through the same USB port. Since the time computation for chaﬀ point addition is
done using dedicated hardware, it is independent of the operating system overheads. An AVR UC3A364-based
application board is used as dedicated hardware for chaﬀ generation. It is a 32-bit microcontroller with 64 KB
flash memory and can be easily connected to computer via a USB 2.0 cable as shown in Figure 4. The AVR UC3
A3/A4 Series is designed for very high data throughput with Hi-Speed USB device and host, SD/SDIO card,
and Multi-Level-Cell (MLC) NAND flash with ECC and SDRAM interfaces. It is designed for cost-sensitive
embedded applications that require low power consumption, high code density, and high performance because
of which it is well suited for various biometric applications.
6. Results and analysis
The results are computed using the FVC 2002 database and live database considering all those images in which
the number of extracted minutiae points is as per the requirement in Table 1. In order to make a fair comparison
of the proposed approach with Clancy’s approach and Nguyen’s approach, their results are recomputed using
the same experimental setup. For fuzzy vault implementation the secret key of 128-bit is considered with a
polynomial of degree 8. Galois field (GF) (2 16 ) is used as a prime field for polynomial computations. The
number of chaﬀ points added is 10 times the genuine minutiae points. The threshold value δ(M an) is computed
as 15 using Eq. (10), which is considered as 12 for Clancy and Nguyen’s approaches. Table 1 shows the time
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comparison of Clancy and modified Clancy’s approaches for chaﬀ point generation in ms. The average chaﬀ
point addition time is computed for both the approaches. The values from five iterations for each case are
considered and the average value of time taken to add the required number of chaﬀ points is computed. Table
2 represents computation of average chaﬀ point generation time for Clancy’s and modified Clancy’s approaches
for fingerprint images of four persons (F 1 to F 4 ) having 13 minutiae points considering 5 iterations per person.
Table 1. Time comparison of Clancy and modified Clancy’s approach for chaﬀ point generation.

Sr. no.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

No. of genuine
minutiae points
9
10
12
13
14
20
22
23
25

No. of
chaﬀ points
90
100
120
130
140
200
220
230
250

Average chaﬀ point
Clancy’s algorithm
241.18
330.7
511.82
643.44
915.74
3446.78
5241.15
8730.25
14,096.34

generation time (ms)
Modified Clancy’s algorithm
3.36
4.42
6.1
7.80
10.33
34.91
49.50
71.92
113.35

Table 3 shows the time comparison of Nguyen and modified Nguyen’s approach for chaﬀ point generation.
It is observed that there is reduction in average chaﬀ point generation time for the modified Nguyen chaﬀ
generation algorithm, which is even more significant in cases where the number of minutiae points increases
beyond 20.
Figure 5a shows the execution time in ms for the generated chaﬀ points in the case of Clancy’s and
modified Clancy’s approaches. It has been observed that there is a significant reduction in chaﬀ generation
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Table 2. Computation of average chaﬀ generation time for generating 130 chaﬀ points.

Fingerprint
images for
four persons
(F1 to F4 )
1st iteration
2nd iteration
3rd iteration
4th iteration
5th iteration
Average time (per image)
Average time for
130 chaﬀ points

Chaﬀ point generation time (ms)
Clancy’s algorithm

Modified Clancy’s algorithm

F1

F2

F3

F4

F1

F2

F3

F4

691.44
756.44
775.92
697.08
606.36
705.45

611.24
537.76
533.4
498.52
520
540.18

501.48
549.2
716.96
553.44
587.16
581.65

585.08
740.52
882.56
695.76
828.36
746.46

8.64
8.84
8.32
8.68
8
8.5

7.24
7.04
7.08
7.12
7.44
7.18

7.32
6.4
6.56
7.28
7.24
6.96

8.04
10
8.8
7.4
8.48
8.54

643.44

7.80

Table 3. Time comparison of Nguyen and modified Nguyen’s approach.

Sr. no.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

No. of
genuine minutiae
9
10
12
13
14
20
22
23
25

No. of chaﬀ
points
90
100
120
130
140
200
220
230
250

Average chaﬀ point generation time (ms)
Nguyen’s algorithm Modified Nguyen’s algorithm
15.41
6.17
23.45
8.34
33.24
8.94
46.04
13.17
44.59
8.45
144.85
20.39
199.8
24.19
293.06
31.31
432.43
45.23

1000

100000

Execution Time ( m Sec)

Execution Time ( m Sec)

time for the proposed approach. It is due to the fact that every time a new chaﬀ point is to be added it has
to be compared with all other existing set of points (genuine minutiae points and chaﬀ points). The existing
approach becomes more compute intensive with the Euclidean distance.

10000
1000
100
10
1
90

100 120 130 140 200 220 230 250

100

10

1
90

100

120

130

140

200

220

230

250

Number of Generated Chaff Points
Number of Generated Chaff Points
Clancy

Modified Clancy

(a) Clancy' s and Modified Clancy’s

Nguyen
(b) Nguyen’s and Modified Nguyen’s

Figure 5. Execution time for chaﬀ generation approaches.

Figure 5b represents the time comparison for generated chaﬀ points in the case of Nguyen’s and modified
Nguyen’s approaches. The chaﬀ generation time is reduced significantly especially when for each chaﬀ point
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addition the distance of all eight adjacent cells from the candidate cell needs to be compared and this occurs
frequently in cases with greater numbers of minutiae points.
Table 4 presents the comparison of number of candidate chaﬀ points for Clancy’s, modified Clancy’s,
Nguyen’s, and modified Nguyen’s approaches. The number of candidate chaﬀ points required to add a set
number of chaﬀ points is computed for all four approaches, namely Clancy’s, modified Clancy’s, Nguyen’s, and
modified Nguyen’s. The average value of five iterations for each case is considered.
Table 4. Comparison of number of candidate chaﬀ points for Clancy’s, modified Clancy’s, Nguyen’s, and modified
Nguyen’s approaches.

Sr. no.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

No. of
genuine
minutiae
points
9
10
12
13
14
20
22
23
25

No. of
chaﬀ
points
90
100
120
130
140
200
220
230
250

Average number of candidate chaﬀ points
Modified
Modified
Clancy’s
Clancy’s
Nguyen’s Nguyen’s
algorithm algorithm algorithm algorithm
132
130
185
185
159
160
247
246
208
199
340
314
239
239
430
437
296
289
431
398
710
693
1131
1011
962
902
1484
1204
1425
1211
1979
1557
2080
1733
2738
2269

Number of Candidate Chaff Points

Figure 6 shows the comparison of number of candidate points required to generate chaﬀ points in the case
of Clancy’s, modified Clancy’s, Nguyen’s, and modified Nguyen’s approaches. The reduction in candidate chaﬀ
points in the proposed approaches can be observed easily in Table 4 and Figure 6, especially when the number
of chaﬀ points increases above 20. The reduction can be attributed to threshold equivalence and probability of
number of candidate chaﬀ points for required number of minutiae points, which may vary in most cases.
5000

500

50
90

100 120 130 140 200 220 230 250
Number of Generated Chaff Points
Nguyen
Modified Nguyen
Clancy
Modified Clancy

Figure 6. Number of candidate chaﬀ points generated for required chaﬀ in case of Clancy’s, modified Clancy’s, Nguyen’s,
and modified Nguyen’s.

Table 5 represents the normalized execution time (T) for chaﬀ point generation for Clancy’s, modified
Clancy’s, Nguyen’s, and modified Nguyen’s approaches. Thus the value of T gives an accurate metric for
execution time comparison. It is computed as follows:
T =

98

Chaﬀ point generation time
Candidate chaﬀ points
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Table 5. Normalized execution time for chaﬀ point generation for Clancy’s, modified Clancy’s, Nguyen’s, and Nguyen’s
approaches.

Sr. no.

No. of genuine
chaﬀ points

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

90
100
120
130
140
200
220
230
250

Normalized execution time (T)
Clancy’s Modified Clancy’s
approach approach
1.827
0.026
2.08
0.028
2.461
0.031
2.692
0.033
3.094
0.036
4.855
0.05
5.448
0.055
6.126
0.059
6.777
0.065

for chaﬀ point in ms
Nguyen’s Modified Nguyen’s
approach approach
0.083
0.033
0.095
0.034
0.098
0.028
0.107
0.03
0.103
0.021
0.128
0.02
0.135
0.02
0.148
0.02
0.158
0.02

7. Performance evaluation
The performance of the system is evaluated in terms of false accept rate (FAR) and false reject rate (FRR). The
database used for the result analysis consists of fingerprint samples of 100 users with 2 fingerprint impressions
of the same finger for each user. FAR is computed considering the first fingerprint impression of each user
as the template and all the fingerprint impressions of all other users as query samples. To compute FRR the
first fingerprint impression of each user is considered as template and the second one as query. Hence, the
total number of genuine attempts to compute the value of FRR is 100 and imposter attempts to compute FAR
are 19,800 for 100 users. For modified Clancy’s approach the values of FAR and FRR are computed as 2%
and 11.6%, respectively. For modified Nguyen’s approach the FAR and FRR are calculated as 2% and 11%,
respectively. The performance of the proposed algorithms has been increased in terms of chaﬀ generation time.
However, the performance of the system in terms of FAR and FRR remains the same as that of the baseline
algorithms since the focus of the research work is on reducing the chaﬀ generation time of the existing algorithms
majorly in use while implementing fuzzy vault.
8. Conclusion
It has been observed in the experimental results that the time required for chaﬀ generation is reduced to a
greater extent in the case of modified Clancy’s and modified Nguyen’s approaches by using the Manhattan
distance as a metric for distance comparison while generating a new chaﬀ point. It has also been observed
that the number of candidate chaﬀ points is reduced with the increase in number of minutiae points in case of
modified Clancy’s and Nguyen’s approaches. The approach also reduces the complex computations to simple
ones. Since the proposed approach has been evaluated on a dedicated hardware system, it can be deployed in
real-time application scenarios.
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